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Category: Judiciary

  • THE QUIET VIOLENCE OF PROCEDURE II: When Courts Resist Communication in the Age of E-Justice, A Reflection on Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v Bbaaka Property Consultants (U) Ltd

    THE QUIET VIOLENCE OF PROCEDURE II: When Courts Resist Communication in the Age of E-Justice, A Reflection on Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v Bbaaka Property Consultants (U) Ltd

    Enen Legal World Logo


    There is another kind of quiet violence in procedure.

    Not when the law assumes communication where none exists.
    But when communication eventually occurs, and the law still struggles to recognise its procedural legitimacy because it arrived through unfamiliar technological form.

    Days ago, in my earlier critique, The Quiet Violence of Procedure: When Digital Service Serves No One, I warned against a growing procedural danger within Uganda’s evolving E‑Justice architecture. I argued that a notice uploaded into ECCMIS is not necessarily a notice received; that “deemed service” is not always effective service; and that digital systems may satisfy procedural form while silently excluding the very litigants whose rights stand at risk.

    The concern then was technological presumption.

    This time, the concern is technological distrust.


    The Case and Its Difficulties

    In Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v Bbaaka Property Consultants (U) Ltd (Misc. Cause No. 0033 of 2023, 22 May 2026), the High Court held that service through WhatsApp, without prior leave for substituted service, was improper. The Applicant, self‑represented, sent the application to the Respondent company director’s WhatsApp number on 24 February 2023. The director only saw the message weeks later, on 4 April 2023, before instructing counsel who filed a response on behalf of the company.

    The Court struck out the affidavit of service, holding that the Applicant was not authorised to effect service under Order 5 rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules and had not first obtained leave for substituted service. The Court further struck out the Applicant’s supporting affidavit for being argumentative and containing matters of law (contrary to Order 19 rule 3 CPR), and dismissed the application with costs.

    A copy of the decision can be downloaded below:

    Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v Bbaaka Property Consultants (U) Ltd 2026 UGHCCD 154 (22 May 2026)Download


    I do not defend every aspect of the Applicant’s filings. The supporting affidavit may well have been defective under Order 19. The Applicant also admittedly did not first attempt conventional corporate service under Order 29 rule 2 CPR, nor did he obtain prior leave before resorting to WhatsApp. Those are genuine procedural weaknesses.

    But this reflection is not about the affidavit ruling. It is about the service holding – and the deeper jurisprudential questions it raises for Uganda’s digital transformation. I earlier posed the question “Uganda’s Courts are going paperless, the only question left is…are you?“

    I raised a critical concern about the preparedness of lawyers for paperless transition come June 2026. This blog inverses that question back to the courts themselves. With a ruling which effectively rolls back all the gains in the courts’ E-justice and digital transformation journey, I equally ask, “are our courts really ready for a fair, meaningful and realistic digital transformation?“


    The Conceptual Problem

    The real issue is not whether procedural safeguards around electronic service should exist.
    The question is: should courts continue treating direct electronic communication as inherently inferior to conventional physical service, even where actual notice is eventually achieved and no prejudice is demonstrated?

    Historically, substituted service existed because direct communication with a litigant had become impossible, impracticable, or evasive. Newspaper advertisements, affixing summons to premises, or leaving documents with third parties were indirect approximations designed to create the possibility of awareness where direct access could not be achieved.

    WhatsApp communication to a litigant’s verified personal number occupies a very different space.

    It is direct. It is individualised. It is traceable. And in many modern contexts, it may be more personal than conventional physical service itself.

    Traditionally, courts have accepted service where documents are left with receptionists, secretaries, guards, clerks, or relatives – all based on the assumption that the communication will eventually reach the intended recipient. A WhatsApp message arrives directly on the litigant’s personal handset, often with timestamps, delivery indicators, and sometimes read receipts.

    Ironically, historically accepted physical substituted service may sometimes be less direct than modern electronic communication.

    That forces an uncomfortable question:
    In the smartphone era, why should communication sent directly to a litigant’s verified personal number automatically be treated as procedurally inferior to leaving papers with a receptionist, such that prior leave for substituted service is required?”

    The Delay Problem – And Why It Is Not Decisive

    Of course, the facts of this case reveal an important caution. The Respondent director did not see the message immediately. Weeks passed before the communication came to his attention. That delay cannot simply be ignored.

    But the existence of delay does not necessarily establish that the medium itself was defective.

    Physical summons may equally sit unread on office desks for weeks. Letters may remain unopened. Receptionists may misplace documents. The proper procedural inquiry cannot merely be whether awareness occurred instantly, but whether the chosen method was reasonably calculated to bring the proceedings to the attention of the affected party.

    Here, the communication eventually did exactly that.
    The Respondent became aware. Counsel was instructed. An affidavit in reply was filed. Participation followed.

    Which raises another important constitutional question: What actual prejudice was ultimately suffered?

    That question becomes particularly pressing under Article 126(2)(e) of the Constitution, which requires courts to administer substantive justice without undue regard to technicalities – especially where the litigant is self‑represented and navigating complex procedural terrain without legal assistance.

    Even if the Court was correct that service was technically defective, one may still ask whether striking out the affidavit of service, striking out the supporting affidavit, and dismissing the entire application with costs was proportionate. Could the Court instead have directed proper service and allowed rectification, particularly in a human rights enforcement application?

    Uganda’s Own Jurisprudence Already Points Forward

    Long before this dispute arose, Uganda had already begun integrating technology into adjudication. The Constitution (Integration of ICT into the Adjudication Processes for Courts of Judicature) (Practice) Directions, 2019 encouraged the use of technology to improve efficiency and expedition. The Judiciary’s ongoing embrace of ECCMIS, electronic filing, virtual hearings, and paperless procedure reflects an unmistakable institutional movement toward digitally facilitated justice.

    More importantly, Ugandan jurisprudence has already recognised technologically facilitated service itself.

    In Male H Mabirizi K. Kiwanuka v Attorney General, Justice Ssekaana Musa expressly acknowledged that service through “email or facebook or whatsApp or any other technologically advanced means” are methods calculated at bringing proceedings to the attention of parties. The Court further recognised that personal service is required only “wherever practicable” before concluding that service was effective because participation followed.

    A copy of that decision can be accessed below:

    Male Mabilizi v Attorney General (Miscellaneous Application No 918 of 2021) 2022 UGHCCD 50 (27 January 2022)Download


    That reasoning shifts procedural legitimacy away from ceremonial delivery and toward communicative effectiveness.

    And that is where the Bakampa ruling becomes difficult to reconcile with the Judiciary’s broader digital trajectory.

    A Concrete Way Forward

    What is needed is not a revolution, but a practice direction.

    The Chief Justice should issue guidance clarifying that electronic service via WhatsApp, SMS, or similar direct messaging platforms – when sent to a verified number and followed by reasonable confirmation (such as a follow‑up call or text) – may be recognised as valid service without prior leave, provided that:

    · The sender proves actual notice (e.g., delivery receipt, screenshot, or acknowledgment);
    · No prejudice is caused to the recipient (e.g., sufficient time to respond);
    · The court retains power to set aside service if injustice is shown.

    This would bring Uganda’s procedural law into alignment with its own constitutional commitment to substantive justice and its declared embrace of digital transformation.


    Conclusion

    Uganda’s courts now stand between two procedural imaginations. One remains rooted in paper legitimacy and inherited analog assumptions. The other recognises that constitutional fairness depends not on the medium, but on whether proceedings actually come to the attention of the affected party.

    That tension is no longer merely technological. It is jurisprudential.

    In Geoffrey Gatete & Another v William Kyobe, the Supreme Court distinguished between “deemed service” and “effective service,” warning that procedural law may presume notice without proving actual awareness. The Bakampa difficulty inverts that concern: awareness eventually existed, participation followed, yet the communication remained procedurally suspect because it arrived through a medium still viewed with doctrinal caution.

    This is not an argument against procedural safeguards.
    It is an argument for procedural realism in the age of digital justice.

    Because justice does not only fail when communication never reaches.
    Sometimes, it also falters when the law hesitates to recognise communication after it has already arrived.

    DISCLAIMERS:

    This blog is not an attack on the Learned Judge in the Bakampa decision.  It is fair commentary intended to foster a discussion and self reflection on the Judiciary’s forthcoming paperless transition to fully digital courts, for E-justice and digital transformation must serve justice rather than suffocate or truncate it.

    This blog is not intended to be used as a substitute for legal advice. The author accepts no liability or responsibility for any losses that arise from use of information as legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult a licensed attorney of their choice for situation specific  legal advice.

    Enen Ambrose
    Member, Judiciary Affairs Committee, Uganda Law Society.

    For comments or feedback, write to: enen@enenlegalworld.com 

  • Uganda’s Courts Are Going Paperless. The Only Question Left Is… Are You?

    Uganda’s Courts Are Going Paperless. The Only Question Left Is… Are You?

    Enen Legal World Logo


    In a matter of days, somewhere in Kampala, an advocate will walk into chambers carrying a file.
    A real file.
    Bound in cardboard.
    Stuffed with pleadings.
    Scarred by coffee stains.
    Held together by registry stamps, handwritten notes, and the quiet traditions that have shaped Uganda’s legal profession for generations.
    He will place it on his desk.
    He will call his clerk.
    He will ask about the service.
    He will ask whether the registry finally responded.
    He will ask whether the ruling was uploaded.
    He will ask if tomorrow’s matter still appears on the court list.
    And without fully realizing it…
    He may already be practising history.

    Because on 17 February 2026, Uganda’s Chief Justice signed an administrative circular that quietly accelerated what many had long assumed was still years away.

    And on 1 June 2026, every advocate practising before courts integrated into ECCMIS will begin to feel the reality of it.
    Paper files, as we know them, begin to lose their dominance.
    Not theoretically.
    Not academically.
    Not someday.
    This June.

    Suddenly, a question that once sounded futuristic now feels deeply personal:
    Is the Ugandan legal profession actually prepared for digitally operational courts?
    Not on conference banners.
    Not in panel discussions.
    Not on LinkedIn posts celebrating innovation.
    In chambers.
    In active files.
    In client communication.
    In deadlines.
    In operational reality.
    And if we are being honest, this conversation did not begin with me.

    The Judiciary has moved.
    ECCMIS has moved.
    The Uganda Law Society has moved.
    Developers have moved.
    Institutions have moved.
    The only chambers left to convince… may now be our own.
    Because if we are being painfully honest, many firms are still operating through fragmented systems held together largely by human effort.
    Some clerks still physically chase court lists.

    Some advocates still log into ECCMIS repeatedly “to check.”
    Some clients still travel to court only to discover their matter was adjourned hours earlier.
    Some managing partners still call chambers late in the evening, asking whether rulings were uploaded.
    Some firms still lose valuable hours searching through paper trails for information that should already be accessible instantly.
    None of this reflects incompetence.
    It reflects transition.
    And in June, transition becomes unavoidable.
    Because nostalgia will not file pleadings.
    Sentiment has never uploaded a PDF.
    And operational inefficiency increasingly carries reputational consequences.

    Days ago, in my previous article, The Quiet Violence of Procedure, I argued that justice does not always fail loudly. Sometimes it fails quietly – inside missed notifications, delayed communication, inaccessible records, and systems that store information without truly delivering it to the people who need it.
    Technology alone does not solve that problem.
    Preparedness does.

    Shortly after publishing that article, I received a phone call from a Ugandan technology company, Riyale Tech Solutions. I assumed the conversation would be defensive. Instead, the invitation was remarkably simple:
    “Counsel… come and see.”
    So I went.
    And what I encountered forced me to confront an uncomfortable possibility:

    What if the profession is not facing a technology problem at all… but a preparedness problem?

    Because what I saw was not merely software in the conventional sense. It was an attempt to redesign how legal practice operationally functions in the ECCMIS era.
    Imagine chambers operating from one secure digital environment where drafting, filing, billing, scheduling, client communication, and court updates exist together rather than in disconnected fragments.

    A matter moves in ECCMIS – and the Advocate knows immediately.
    A notice is issued, and the chambers know immediately.
    More importantly, the client knows too.
    Automatically.

    Through WhatsApp.
    Through SMS.
    Through email.
    No chasing.
    No uncertainty.
    No “let me first call my clerk.”

    For years, lawyers adapted themselves to court systems.
    For the first time, platforms are beginning to adapt around lawyers.

    And perhaps most surprisingly, this is not imported software retrofitted for Uganda. It is Ugandan-built technology designed specifically around the operational realities of Ugandan legal practice.

    A client in Kampala, Gulu, Arua, Mbarara, Nairobi, London, or Dubai can securely monitor the progress of their matter in real time.
    Invoices are generated systematically.
    Records organize themselves.
    Court updates synchronize automatically.
    Internal workflows become visible.
    Communication becomes traceable.
    In that moment, a law firm stops functioning merely as a paper-dependent physical office and begins operating as a modern legal institution.

    This article is not an advertisement.
    It is an observation about where legal practice in Uganda appears to be heading.
    Because in the ECCMIS era, legal excellence may still win cases – but operational efficiency will increasingly win client confidence.
    And that reality raises difficult questions.
    Which firms will adapt fastest?
    Which firms will attract the next generation of clients?
    Which chambers will build operational resilience?
    Which firms will continue spending valuable hours managing paperwork while competitors focus on strategy, advocacy, and growth?
    Technology itself does not threaten the legal profession.
    Irrelevance does.
    Paperless courts alone do not create digital justice.
    Prepared lawyers do.
    Over the past week, conversations around legal technology have intensified – among advocates, managing partners, clerks, judicial officers, and law students alike, all asking versions of the same question:
    “What does readiness actually look like?”
    For the first time, I may now have at least one answer.
    Because on June 1st, paper may begin leaving Uganda’s courtrooms.
    But excuses may begin leaving the profession, too.

    Riyale Tech Solutions offers a comprehensive legal management system integrated with ECCMIS, designed to support law firms transitioning into Uganda’s digital court environment. It centralises case management, client records, document handling, billing, scheduling, and daily operations into a single structured system.
    Through real-time synchronisation with ECCMIS, case updates are automatically reflected without requiring repeated manual logins.
    The platform also delivers instant notifications via email and WhatsApp, ensuring that both advocates and clients remain informed as matters progress.

    Now let me be equally clear. I hold no equity, ownership, employment, or decision-making role in Riyale Tech Solutions or any affiliated legal technology provider discussed in this article.
    Any professional introductions that may arise between practitioners and technology providers do not influence the opinions expressed here, which remain independently formed.

    Enen Ambrose

    Battle hardened RNB Ethusiast; deliberately pushing #Digital Transformation, one of the 4Ds of the RNB Back on track Mantra.
    Member, Judiciary Affairs Committee
    Uganda Law Society
    For feedback or questions:
    enen@enenlegalworld.com

  • When Courts Confuse Asymmetry with Injustice: Kenya’s AI Ruling and the Fear of the Machine

    When Courts Confuse Asymmetry with Injustice: Kenya’s AI Ruling and the Fear of the Machine

    A comparative East African reflection on artificial intelligence, procedural fairness, and the future of legal drafting

    Enen Legal World Logo.


    A self-represented litigant in Nairobi used artificial intelligence to draft his pleadings. He reviewed, edited, and adopted every word. He swore no fabricated cases, no false citations. He acted transparently, disclosing his use of AI tools.

    Then the High Court of Kenya at Milimani set aside his judgment, called his conduct an abuse of process, and barred him from ever filing any “machine‑generated” pleading in any Kenyan court – unless Parliament first passes a law explicitly allowing AI‑assisted drafting.

    That is not judicial caution. It is judicial anxiety in the face of technological disruption.

    The Ruling in Brief

    In Republic of Kenya, High Court at Nairobi County, Milimani High Court, HCJRMISC/E120/2025 (ruling delivered 16 April 2026), Justice J. Chigiti (SC) considered whether it is legal to draft pleadings using artificial intelligence tools. The respondent/ex parte applicant admitted using what he described as ordinary digital tools, including legal research tools, to assist in writing. He maintained that he had personally reviewed, edited, and adopted every document and remained personally responsible for all factual statements on oath and legal citations. He argued that his pleadings contained no fabricated cases, false citations, or invented quotations, and that, being self‑represented, he had used lawful tools to participate effectively in court.

    The Court disagreed. It held that:

    · The use of personalised drafting tools, structures and methodologies not provided for under the rules of drafting was “deplorable”.
    · Allowing such departures would create a “litigation disaster” leaving judges with no guiding beacons.
    · Generating pleadings through unknown tools or AI gives an unfair advantage to the user, amounting to an affront to access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution.
    · The fact the applicant admitted using such tools amounted to an abuse of court.
    · The applicant could not “vouch for or verify for the court the truthfulness or accuracy” of AI‑generated pleadings, because that would mean he acted as a judge in his own case, violating natural justice.

    On that basis, the Court barred the applicant from filing any other pleadings in any court that are machine‑generated, unless a law is passed in Kenya allowing or providing for drafting using artificial intelligence tools.

    The Court did observe that technology is a powerful socio‑economic growth tool when harnessed within a legal framework, and invited the Rules Committee to consider amending the Civil Procedure Rules through public participation to embrace technology and AI drafting rules. But the prohibition stands.



    The Flaws in the Judgment

    Respectfully, the ruling cannot withstand serious scrutiny. I identify four fundamental errors.

    1. The “Procedural Integrity” Error

    The Court reasoned that because the Civil Procedure Rules do not mention AI, using AI is unlawful. But the Civil Procedure Rules do not mention laptops, either. They do not mention word processors, grammar‑check software, the delete key, or the backspace button. No judge has ever struck a pleading for being typed rather than handwritten.

    Silence in the rules is not a prohibition. It is a gap that the rules themselves empower courts to fill – reasonably, proportionately, and with an eye to justice, not to ritual.

    2. The “Unfair Advantage” Error – This One Is Fatal

    The Court held that a litigant using AI has an unfair advantage over one who does not, and that this violates equality of arms.

    Let us apply that logic consistently.

    · Google vs. Law Reports – A lawyer with a smartphone and an internet connection can find authorities in seconds. Another, relying on a dusty shelf of hardbound law reports, takes hours. Is that unfair? No judge has ever said so.
    · AfricanLii / KenyaLii – These digital databases make case law searchable, cross‑referenced, and instantly accessible. A litigant without them is at a disadvantage. Has any court called that an affront to Article 48? On the contrary, the Judiciary itself promotes these tools.
    · Ulii (Uganda Legal Information Institute) – It now uses AI to summarise judgments. No judge in Uganda has condemned it. No advocate has been barred for citing an AI‑generated summary. The tool is public, free, and welcomed.
    · Modern medicine – A patient in a Nairobi teaching hospital has access to MRI scans, robotic surgery, and AI‑assisted diagnostics. A patient in a remote clinic does not. That inequality is real. But no court has banned MRI machines because not everyone can afford them. The answer is to spread the technology, not to ban it.

    The Court confused asymmetry with injustice. An asymmetry is unjust only when it is arbitrary (only one side gets the tool), hidden (use is not disclosed), or undermines a core right (such as the ability to test evidence). None of those conditions applied here. The litigant disclosed his AI use. The tools are widely available. And the core right – to present a truthful, coherent pleading – was enhanced, not undermined.

    If the Court’s logic were applied consistently, we would still be filing pleadings in quill and ink. The unfair advantage is not in the tool. It is in the refusal to adapt.

    3. The “Judicial Capacity” Error

    The Court said it cannot “verify” AI‑generated content, so the safer course is to ban it entirely.

    But courts never “verify” how a human wrote a pleading. They do not audit pen strokes, interview secretaries, or review dictation logs. They look at the final document. If it contains lies, fake cases, or false citations, they sanction the filer. That same framework works perfectly well for AI.

    The Court could have required disclosure, a personal verification oath, and a statement that no fabricated content is included. That is governance, not prohibition. Instead, it chose the nuclear option.

    4. The “Parliament’s Prerogative” Error

    The Court held that only Parliament, not the courts, can authorise AI use in legal process.

    Artificial intelligence is not a controlled substance. It is a tool. Courts do not need a statute to permit the use of search engines, word processors, or online databases. They do not need an Act of Parliament to allow a lawyer to take a typing class.

    Mandating a legislative framework for basic productivity software is not judicial restraint. It is jurisdictional abdication.

    —

    A Constitutional Mirror: Article 159 of the Kenya Constitution

    The ruling’s approach sits uneasily with Kenya’s own constitutional framework. Article 159(2)(d) of the Kenya Constitution 2010 commands that “justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities.”

    Procedure exists to serve justice – not to imprison it. A prohibition on an entire category of drafting tools, without any evidence of misuse, elevates form over substance. That is precisely what Article 159 warns against.

    If a self‑represented litigant files a pleading that is truthful, coherent, and personally verified, does the mere fact that an AI assisted in its composition make it less worthy of consideration? The Constitution suggests the answer is no.

    —

    What the Court Could Have Done – And What Others Are Doing

    A more thoughtful, proportionate approach is not only possible; it is already being implemented elsewhere.

    In Kenya itself, Justice Bahati Mwamuye recently struck out an AI‑assisted filing – but for procedural defects (missing notice statements, non‑compliant affidavits), not for AI use itself. He gave the litigant leave to refile. That is proportionate. (See AllAfrica, 11 March 2026)

    Internationally, Singapore’s State Courts have issued a detailed Guide on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools by Court Users (effective 1 October 2024). Lawyers may use AI but remain fully responsible for all content; must fact‑check; must not fabricate evidence; violations may lead to sanctions. No prohibition. Just governance. (Registrar’s Circular No. 9, State Courts of Singapore)

    In Estonia, small contract disputes below €7,000 can be decided by an AI judge that proposes a decision; a human judge then reviews and may modify or set it aside. That system has reduced backlog without sacrificing due process. (Law Society Journal, Australia, August 2024)

    Even Kenya’s own Chief Justice, Martha Koome, announced in August 2025 that the Judiciary is developing an AI Adoption Policy Framework to guide integration of AI tools while safeguarding judicial independence, data privacy and due process. (Judiciary of Kenya official website, 11 August 2025)

    The Chigiti ruling is swimming against the tide of its own institution’s planning.

    The correct path is clear:

    · Disclosure – A litigant or lawyer using AI to draft pleadings should disclose that fact.
    · Verification – The filer must personally review and adopt all content, swearing to its truthfulness.
    · Accountability – False citations, fabricated cases, or misleading content remain sanctionable, whether written by a human or generated by a machine.
    · No prohibition – The tool itself is not the offence. Misuse is.

    The Legal Profession Responds

    Prominent Kenyan lawyers have reacted with dismay.

    Ahmednasir Abdullahi, SC, one of Kenya’s most respected advocates, wrote on X: “What an absurd decision. Does it matter whether one drafts pleadings using AI tools or uses a typewriter? It is none of the court’s business.” (Nairobi Law Monthly, 21 April 2026)

    Steve Biko Wafula, senior counsel, published a detailed critique: “This ruling reads less like modern jurisprudence and more like a judicial panic attack in the face of technological change… The court had a first‑rate jurisprudential problem in its hands and squandered it, trying instead to drag the administration of justice back into the pre‑digital age.” (Soko Directory, 21 April 2026)

    These are not fringe voices. They are the heart of the Kenyan bar.

    A Word to My Ugandan Colleagues – And to Our Judges

    I write from Uganda, where we have not (yet) seen a ruling of this kind. Our judges have quietly tolerated – perhaps even welcomed – the steady digitisation of practice. We use e‑filing, and we cite Ulii’s AI‑generated summaries without panic.

    But the same instinct that produced the Chigiti ruling lives everywhere: the fear that the machine will replace the judge, that the algorithm will swallow the advocate, that technology will dissolve the profession’s hard‑won exclusivity.

    That fear is misplaced.

    AI does not abolish judgment. It does not abolish ethics. It does not abolish the court’s ultimate authority. What AI abolishes is inefficiency – hours spent searching for authorities that software can locate in seconds, repetitive drafting, and the false prestige built around scarcity of technical knowledge.

    And perhaps that is what truly frightens some corners of the profession. When information becomes democratised, gatekeepers begin to sweat.

    But justice does not belong to the gatekeepers. It belongs to the public. And the public does not care whether a pleading was drafted by candlelight, typewriter, Microsoft Word, or artificial intelligence. The public cares whether justice is accessible, affordable, timely, intelligible, and fair.

    If AI helps achieve that mission, then resisting it is not conservatism. It is obstruction. And obstruction disguised as professionalism remains obstruction.

    Conclusion: The Future Cannot Be Injuncted

    History is littered with institutions that initially resisted the printing press, telephones, computers and the internet – only to later embrace them as essential tools.

    Did the world wait for a complete legal framework before embracing mobile money? Did banks issue a constitutional petition before M‑Pesa rewired African commerce? Did Western Union obtain an injunction against digital wallets because “money transfers” had traditionally been their sacred territory? Of course not.

    Technology arrived. Society adapted. Regulators followed. That is how civilisation has always moved.

    The same will happen with AI in the legal profession. The only remaining question is: will courts lead this transformation – or become footnotes in it?

    To our Kenyan brothers and sisters: this ruling is a warning for all of us. Not because Kenya is wrong, but because the same instinct – to fear the machine, to reach for a prohibition when a guideline would suffice – lives in every jurisdiction, including ours. The question is not whether Uganda will face this debate. The question is whether we will face it more wisely.

    And to any judge reading this: thank you for your service. But please, do not ban the future. Regulate it, guide it, human‑oversight it – but do not pretend that a tool becomes an abuse simply because it is new.

    This time, let us not make the same mistake.

    ― END ―

    Disclaimer: This blog is a critique of a judicial ruling and a contribution to the conversation on technology and legal practice. It is not intended as legal advice, nor as an attack on any judicial officer or institution. The author remains committed to the rule of law, judicial independence, and the responsible integration of technology into the administration of justice.

    Enen Ambrose.  (File photo)


    Enen Ambrose

    Member: Judiciary Affairs Committee

    Uganda Law Society

    For feedback or questions, write to: enen@enenlegalworld.com

  • The Quiet Violence of Procedure: When Digital Service Serves No One

    The Quiet Violence of Procedure: When Digital Service Serves No One

    Enen Legal World Logo.


    There is a quiet violence in procedure. It does not shout. It does not argue. It simply assumes; and in that assumption, rights collapse without anyone noticing. This is exactly what happened in two recent High Court decisions: Visare Uganda Ltd vs Festus Katerega T/A Quickway Auctioneers and 3 others. A copy of it can be accessed here:

    Visare Uganda Limited v Katerega Others (Miscellaneous Application 2855 of 2023) 2024 UGCommC 38 (19 February 2024) 2Download

    and: Western Cable Company Limited vs. Juliet Namuli Asiya and 7 others. A copy of the rulinf can be accessed here:

    Ruling MA 2289 of 2025 Western Cables(1)Download



    A case is filed. A hearing date is fixed. Somewhere deep within a digital system, a notice is uploaded. The law nods in satisfaction: service has been effected. The machinery moves. The courtroom sits. The judge writes. And somewhere else, perhaps across the city, perhaps across a fragile internet connection, a litigant knows nothing.

    We call this progress.

    We call this efficiency.

    We even call it justice.

    In the recent ruling of the High Court of Uganda in Misc. Application No. 2289 of 2025, the court took the position that once a hearing notice is posted onto ECCMIS, service is complete. It held that it is not mandatory for a party to actually receive an email or SMS notification, so long as the system reflects that service was effected.

    The implication is stark: the burden shifts entirely to the litigant or counsel to constantly monitor the system. Failure to do so is fatal. A case may be dismissed. Rights may evaporate. And yet, in the eyes of the law, nothing has gone wrong.

    But open justice demands something far more stubborn, far more human. It demands not that proceedings merely exist in public form, but that those whose rights are at stake are actually present; or at the very least, actually aware. The old wisdom insisted that justice must be seen to be done. It did not imagine a world where justice could be technically visible yet practically invisible; where a notice exists, but never reaches; where a hearing occurs, but never touches the party it condemns.

    And this is not an abstract concern. It is a doctrinal one.

    The Supreme Court of Uganda, in Geoffrey Gatete & Another v William Kyobe, confronted a similar question under the language of “deemed good service.” The Court drew a careful and deliberate distinction; one that modern digital procedure now risks erasing.

    It held that “deemed service” is a legal fiction, a procedural convenience that allows courts to proceed even where actual notice may not be proven. But it went further to warn that such service does not necessarily amount to “effective service.” For service to be effective, it must achieve its intended purpose: to bring the proceedings to the attention of the party.

    A copy of the decision in Gatete can be accessed here:

    geoffrey-gatete-and-another-v-william-kyobe-2007-ugsc-7-21-september-200 (2)Download



    This distinction is not semantic. It is foundational.

    Because once the law accepts that something may be “deemed” without being real, it must also accept the consequences; that the fiction may fail in practice. And where it fails, justice demands correction.

    Yes, there will be cases where a litigant deliberately avoids monitoring the system. But the system cannot punish the many for the bad faith of the few; especially when actual notice remains technically possible.

    Yet the modern system presses on, collapsing this distinction. ECCMIS becomes both the record and the proof, both the act and its consequence. Once a notice is uploaded, the law assumes its journey is complete.

    But a system is not a voice. A database is not a message. A record is not communication.

    And so we arrive at a troubling convergence: a digital architecture that satisfies procedural form while undermining substantive awareness.

    Context makes this even more urgent. Even in Kampala, internet access is not constant. Connectivity fluctuates. Costs are high. Power is unreliable. To build a legal system on the assumption that litigants and advocates will perpetually monitor an online platform is to design justice for an ideal world, not the real one.

    What then becomes of open justice?

    It remains, perhaps, in architecture. The courtroom doors are still open. The rulings are still written. The processes are still documented. But the litigant; the very person for whom the system exists; may never arrive, not out of defiance, but out of ignorance.

    And in that moment, something profound happens.

    Justice is no longer denied loudly. It is denied quietly.

    Not in secrecy, but in silence.

    Not by concealment, but by assumption.

    Justice does not only die in closed courtrooms. It also dies in silent systems, where notices exist, but never reach.

    This is not an argument against technology. It is an argument against unquestioned technology. Against systems that replace human communication with automated presumption. Against a jurisprudence that confuses efficiency with fairness.

    The answer is neither retreat nor resistance. It is correction.

    If ECCMIS is to be the backbone of modern judicial administration, then it must evolve beyond being a passive repository into an active communicator. It must speak, not just store. It must reach, not just record.

    External notification systems are not luxuries; they are necessities. SMS alerts. Email notifications. Web based and Android Push Notifications, Real-time prompts that move beyond the confines of the system and into the lived reality of the user. And more than that, they must not be optional embellishments. They must be integral guarantees, designed to ensure that service is not merely deemed, but actually effected.

    The Judiciary and the architects behind ECCMIS stand at a critical threshold. They have built the infrastructure. Now they must build the connection.

    Because the law may deem service to be good, but justice demands that service be real.

    A system that merely stores notices, without ensuring they reach those whose rights are at stake, does not advance justice, it endangers it. In a jurisdiction where access to digital infrastructure is uneven, to insist that litigants must constantly patrol an online platform is to replace fairness with fiction.

    Technology must serve justice, not obscure it.

    There is an old wisdom in scripture: No one lights a lamp and puts it under a bed. Instead, they set it on a stand, so that those who enter may see.

    ECCMIS is that lamp, lit, visible in theory. But when a notice sits in a database without actively reaching the litigant, we have placed it under the bed. The light exists. It just does not shine where it is needed most. (Mark 4:21)

    Let ECCMIS evolve, blending its internal efficiency with robust external communication, ensuring that every litigant is not merely assumed to know, but is given a real opportunity to know.

    For if justice is to remain open, it must also remain visible.

    Otherwise, quietly and without protest,
    justice will die in the darkness of its own systems.
    -THE END-

    Disclaimers:

    This Blog is not an attack on the Judicial officers who handed down the two decisions criticised above. It is not an attack on the institution of the Judiciary or EECMIS developers. It is intended to spark conversations to make E-Justice and the whole E-Government Digital Transformation a complete and wholesome journey and / or experience. 

    This Blog is not to be substituted for or taken for legal advice. The author does not accept responsibility or liability for damage suffered as a result of its use as legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult a qualified and licensed attorney for situation specific legal advice.

    Enen Ambrose. (Personal Archive)

    Enen Ambrose

    Member, Judiciary Affairs Committee of

    Uganda Law Society.

    For feedback or questions, write to: enen@enenlegalworld.com

  • EPISODE 5: THE KENYAN MIRROR

    EPISODE 5: THE KENYAN MIRROR

    Enen Legal World Logo


    Disclaimer: The story of Cecil Miller is drawn from historical accounts, particularly Paul Mwangi’s The Black Bar. This retelling is a synthesis for the purpose of public education and advocacy. Readers of this Blog are encouraged to purchase a copy for the full account and context of The Black Bar by Paul Mwangi (SC)


    If you are joining us for the first time: In Episode 4, Owera Apur knelt under the 160‑year‑old ojede cii tree and poured out his soul. He called on Zakayo, on the ancestors, on the spirits of the land. He asked the question no constitution can answer: How then shall we live when the council is bought and the granary is empty? The leaves trembled. Something, somewhere, had heard the cry.

    Tonight, the ancestors reply. Not with wind. With a mirror.


    I. THE FOREIGN SEED

    In the 1970s a contract judge arrived in Kenya from Guyana. His name was Cecil Henry Ethelwood Miller. By blood he was a Black Pan‑Africanist, a World War II pilot who had “dusted the Aryan race.” By reputation he should have been a hero.

    By work ethic he was almost useless.

    But President Daniel Arap Moi saw hunger in Miller’s eyes. So Moi gave him Kenyan citizenship, a constitutional tenure as a High Court judge, a large plantation, and a Mercedes‑Benz limousine. The same way Owera Apur opened his granary to his nephew Okello, Moi opened the highest doors of the judiciary to a man who had never built anything.

    Miller’s appetite only grew. He wanted to be Chief Justice. He understood the price: total, slavish loyalty to Moi. The ancestors watched the foreign seed take deep root in Kenyan soil.

    Chief Justice Emeritus of the Republic of Kenya: His Lordship Cecil Henry Ethelwood Miller. Copyright owned by Miller & Co. Advocates. Used under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.


    II. THE COMMISSION OF THE INCOMPETENT

    In 1983 President Moi wanted to destroy his once‑powerful minister Charles Njonjo. He set up a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate Njonjo for alleged abuse of office, everything from amassing firearms to plotting coups. The commission was widely seen as a kangaroo court, designed to humiliate Njonjo and drive him out of politics.

    Miller was one of three commissioners. He walked in carrying two things: a personal grudge against Njonjo (who had once passed him over for promotion) and zero judicial independence.

    The transcripts from The Black Bar are excruciating. During the hearings, lead counsel Lee Muthoga probed Njonjo about whether he had paid an MP, Amos Ng’ang’a, to resign his parliamentary seat so Njonjo could run for it. The exchange was tense. Njonjo’s lawyer, Mr. Deverell, kept interrupting with sarcastic remarks, at one point suggesting that “any other consideration” might include buying ice‑cream.

    Miller exploded:

    “You keep making your jokes, Mr. Deverell. You keep on making your jokes. In the long run you may find it is not going to accrue to your credibility and your status before this inquiry. You keep on making your jokes. You take out your cold icecream and push it into your mouth. Proceed please.”

    The outburst revealed Miller’s predetermined hostility. He was not there to inquire; he was there to convict. Deverell saw the commission for what it was: a kangaroo court designed to destroy Njonjo.

    The mission succeeded. Njonjo was politically crushed.

    And in 1986 Miller was rewarded exactly as he had schemed: he was sworn in as Chief Justice of Kenya.

    A man whose judicial temperament was summed up by an ice‑cream joke now controlled every judge in the Republic.

    The ancestors were already laughing.

    III. THE HABEAS CORPUS THAT MILLER STRANGLED

    On 6 April 1987 a man named Stephen Mbaraka Karanja kissed his wife goodbye in Limuru and left for Nairobi. He was never seen alive again.

    After seven weeks of desperate searching, his wife filed a writ of habeas corpus asking the court to order the CID Director to produce her husband.

    The case came before Justice Derek Schofield. The CID claimed Karanja had been “shot while escaping.” Schofield did not believe them. He ordered an exhumation, an independent post‑mortem, and affidavits.

    The grave was empty. No body. No records. Schofield issued a notice to the CID Director to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt.

    That was when President Moi sent Chief Justice Cecil Miller himself into Schofield’s chambers with a direct order: “Lay off the case.”

    Schofield refused. He told Miller: tell the President to keep his hands off the judiciary, or I will tell the President myself.

    Miller did not wait.
    On 11 August 1987, without any formal application, without any hearing, Miller summoned the lawyers, seized the file, and transferred the entire matter. He stood the case over “until judges return from vacation.”

    Later he moved it to a known government apologist, who ruled that once a man is dead, habeas corpus cannot issue, because “the person or body” does not mean a corpse.

    Schofield resigned in disgust and left the country.
    The Law Society hosted a farewell dinner. The only senior government officer brave enough to attend was immediately fired.

    Stephen Mbaraka Karanja’s family never got justice. The habeas corpus died in silence.

    The Chief Justice had personally executed a murder cover‑up in open court.

    IV. THE JUDGE WHO FIRED A JUDGE

    By now Miller’s interference was routine. He transferred cases at will, summoned lawyers, stood matters over, and told other judges to “lay off” sensitive files.

    One man refused to bow: Justice Patrick O’Connor.

    Miller tried everything. When nothing worked, he issued a punitive transfer order sending O’Connor to a remote station.

    O’Connor defied it.

    On 26 September 1988 Miller sat down and wrote a single letter:

    “You are hereby dismissed from the service of the Judiciary with immediate effect.”

    No hearing. No tribunal. No reasons. Just one letter from a man who had never earned the seat he sat in.

    O’Connor was gone.
    The message to every honest judge was clear: resist Miller and you die.

    One judge had said no. Miller made sure he would never say anything again.

    V. THE PARKING LOT

    By 1989 Miller had become a drunk, violent eccentric who required armed policemen standing guard outside his chambers, something no Chief Justice before or since has ever needed.

    On a September afternoon he returned from lunch heavily intoxicated. He opened the sealed box he called his “disposal orders”, instructions for how his body should be treated after death. Then he began marching around his chambers shouting drill commands to himself.

    The policemen called the Commissioner of Police.

    Miller burst out, punching the air. He rushed into the High Court parking lot, in full view of journalists, lawyers, and the public.

    There, Cecil Henry Ethelwood Miller, Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya, dropped his trousers.

    He placed one shoe on his head.

    And he marched again.

    Every few steps he stopped, raised his fist, and screamed Moi’s slogan at the top of his lungs:

    “Nyayo! Nyayo!”

    Nyayo meant “footsteps.” He was marching in the President’s footsteps, straight into naked madness.

    The Commissioner of Police and his men wrestled the naked Chief Justice into a car and drove him home.

    No newspaper published the photographs.
    No radio station broadcast the story.
    No television channel dared show the images that filled cameras that day.

    Five days later, on 5 September 1989, Miller died. The official cause was listed as septicemia.

    The real cause was the ancestors’ audit.

    VI. THE ANCESTORS’ AUDIT

    The villagers who had abandoned Miller to his gods did not celebrate. They did not dance. They did not say, “See, justice came.”

    Because justice did not come. The system that made Miller also protected him, even in madness, even in death. His family stayed in the official residence for months. Armed police guarded his widow. The government enforced his vengeance posthumously.

    No one was held accountable. No one was punished. No one even spoke.

    But the ancestors had their way.

    Not through a court. Not through a petition. Not through a judgment. Through a parking lot and a shoe on a head and a slogan shouted by a naked man.

    The ancestors do not file cause lists. They do not wait for submissions. They do not deliberate.

    They simply let the consequences ripen. And when the fruit is ready, it falls.

    Owera Apur’s invocation was answered—not by the council, not by Parliament, not by any human institution. It was answered by the slow, patient gravity of truth.

    VII. HOW THEN SHALL WE LIVE?

    So we return to the question.

    How shall we live when the granary is empty?
    How shall we live when the petition sleeps?
    How shall we live when the door does not open?

    We live like the villagers who finally understand: there is no institution coming to save us.

    We live knowing that the system may never be fixed in our lifetime.
    We live knowing that the judges who betray justice may never face a tribunal.
    We live knowing that the MPs who refuse to legislate may be re‑elected.

    But we also live knowing this:

    The ancestors are patient. The gods are not asleep. And parking lots are everywhere.

    Miller’s story is not a promise of justice. It is a warning against the illusion that power can protect you forever. It is a reminder that the system you build to shield yourself from accountability may one day become the cage you cannot escape.

    So how shall we live?

    We live with our eyes open.
    We live asking the questions at burials.
    We live recording the promises and the failures.
    We live building the granary even if we never eat from it.

    We live like people who know that the ancestors are watching.

    And we leave the rest to them.

    In the final episode: Owera Apur rises from the roots. The leaves speak one last time. The choice that cannot be postponed. We will show that while the ancestors SHALL no doubt have their day, we, their descendants still have a role to play to bring all the living “Okello Anyapos” to order, to serve with intergrity, purpose and accountability.

    Episode 6 drops tomorrow. 5 PM.

    Disclaimer: The story of Cecil Miller is drawn from historical accounts, particularly Paul Mwangi’s The Black Bar. This retelling is a synthesis for the purpose of public education and advocacy. Readers are encouraged to get a copy of the book for a full account of Kenya’s journey of Judicial Accountability as narrated by the author.

    #TheUnbuiltGranary #KenyanMirror #AskIt #OjedeCii

    —

    [End of Episode 5]

  • EPISODE 3: WHILE THE PETITION SLEPT

    EPISODE 3: WHILE THE PETITION SLEPT

    Enen Legal World Logo


    If you are joining us for the first time: In Episode 1, we met Mzee Zakayo, who never built a granary but ate from the labor of others. His son Okello Anyapo inherited his appetite but not his cattle, and emptied his uncle Owera’s granary because he was given access without rules. In Episode 2, we lifted our eyes to Uganda’s constitutional granary, built in 1995, and watched Parliament abandon its duty to build walls around it. We saw the seven famines: the Shs 763 billion justice tax, the incompetence shield, the two-man cartel, the executive pocket veto, the criminalization of transparency, the ghost tier of unaccountable actors, and the commission that judges itself.

    THIS IS THE SOIL FROM WHICH ULS CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 12 OF 2025: UGANDA LAW SOCIETY VS ATTORNEY GENERAL ROSE

    The petition was filed. The Application for a temporary injunction to halt Judicial appointments pending disposal of the main petition; The arguments were made. The rot was laid bare.

    And the Constitutional Court is in no hurry.

    The cause list does not call it. The months pass. The granary empties further.

    Every day the petition sleeps is a day Okello eats.

    Every delay is a verdict delivered without judgment, a verdict that says: this urgency is not our urgency.

    The villagers are watching the courthouse door, just as they watch the granary door.

    And the door does not open.

    WHILE THE PETITION SLEPT

    An urgent Constitutional Application, Application No. 11 of 2025, was filed alongside the main petition. It asked the court to halt all judicial appointments pending the determination of the substantive petition.

    Among the grounds: the Judicial Service Commission was unlawfully constituted, missing the two nominees the Constitution requires from the Uganda Law Society.

    The Constitutional Court did not cause-list that application.

    So the appointments proceeded.

    The new Chief Justice, the Hon. Fr. Flavian Zeija, was sworn in.
    The new Principal Judge, the Hon. Judge Jane Francis Abodo, was sworn in.

    Before his elevation, the Hon. Dr. Justice Zeija was the Deputy Chief Justice. In that capacity, he presided over the very Constitutional Court that received Application No. 11 of 2025, the application asking the court to pause appointments, including his own.

    The court did not list the application. No reasons were given. The appointments proceeded.

    In Abongodero, the elders would say: when the man guarding the granary door benefits from what passes through it, the door stays open.

    These are facts. Draw your own conclusions.

    THE POWER TO STOP ALL THIS LIES IN YOUR HANDS AS A CITIZEN AND AJURI CONSTITUENCY IS PROOF OF CONCEPT.

    The Honorable Hamson Obua did not lose by accident.

    He rehearsed monarchy in public. He crowned himself Holy Trinity, God the Father, Honorable Member of Parliament, Ajuri Constituency, God the Son, Government Chief and God the Holy Spirit, Vice National Chairperson of the National Resistance Movement for Northern Uganda of political titles. He spoke succession like family inheritance: Museveni, then Muhoozi, then Muhoozi’s children.

    Ajuri listened.

    They watched soldiers. They watched a disputed poll. They watched power glare at them from armored vehicles.

    And they voted again.

    Twice in under one month.

    History does not always move slowly. Sometimes it slaps.

    Enter Badman Jalameso.

    Teacher. Organizer. Refusal embodied. Not a dynasty. Not a surname throne. Just a man carried by exhaustion with entitlement.

    Badman Jalameso is not a saint. He is a signal.

    The signal is this: voters will rise when the granary stays empty. They will require answers and when the answers are not forthcoming, The leader who fails to answer appropriately will be sent back home.

    —

    **[End of Episode 3]**

  • EPISODE 2: CHRONICLES OF ABONGODERO VILLAGE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANARY.

    EPISODE 2: CHRONICLES OF ABONGODERO VILLAGE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANARY.

    Enen Legal World Logo


    If you are joining us for the first time: In Episode 1, we visited Abongodero, the village named after Mzee Zakayo’s ingenuity. Zakayo never built a granary. He traded cattle for the harvest of others. His son, Okello Anyapo, inherited land but not discipline. When hunger came, his uncle Owera Apur, the only farmer who actually built, opened his granary to him. No rules. Just access. Okello emptied it, smiled, and said: “You allowed me. I merely accessed.” The proverb, which came from the lesson which Abongodero learnt from Okello Anyapo still echoes: You never send a starving man to the granary.

    NOW LIFT YOUR EYES FROM THE VILLAGE.

    In 1995, Uganda built a granary.

    It was called the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly, our Owera, sweated over it. They filled it with grains, cereals and legumes: independence, fairness, accountability, public trust. They stored enough justice to last generations.

    Then they handed the keys to Parliament and said:

    “Guard this. Build walls around it. Regulate who enters, who eats, who guards. Pass laws to guide the President and the Judicial Service Commission in appointing, disciplining, and removing judicial officers.“

    That was the command. Clear. Deliberate. Unambiguous, store the nation’s granary of justice to feed generations and posterity. 

    For thirty years, Parliament has done what the villagers of Abongodero did.

    They admired the granary.

    They walked around it. They named committees after it. They photocopied the Constitution into the Judicial Service Commission Act, sprinkled it with procedure, some insidous confidentiality and went home. They called that a good day’s job and pocketed fat salaries for dereliction of duty.

    They left the rest to the Commission.


    And what is this Commission?

    A body composed largely of insiders. Judges. Judicial actors. The Attorney General, the government’s chief defender, seated comfortably in a structure that decides the fate of judges who sometimes rule against his own client.

    It is as if Owera had not only handed Anyapo the keys, but appointed Anyapo’s hungriest siblings as the oversight committee to stop him from collecting excessive grains from the granary.

    Friends regulating friends.

    Parliament granted access. Parliament abandoned responsibility.

    And Okello entered.

    BEHOLD THE SEVEN FAMINES

    1. The Shs 763 Billion “Justice Tax”

    The Inspectorate of Government’s 2021 “Cost of Corruption” report estimated that Ugandan court users paid Shs 763 billion in bribes—43% of the 2019 justice sector budget.

    Why?

    Because Parliament never built the walls. The 2025 Regulations ensure that bribery does not lead to a judicial officer’s automatic removal. It whispers. It negotiates. It retires quietly with benefits.

    At any judiciary function, you will hear rhetorical sloganeering about zero tolerance to corruption.  The truth is the leadership and the whole institution preaches water and drinks wine. The structure of the Judicial Service Regulations, 2025 creates elite favors for the Judge, Registrars and the Magistrates.


    We hunt “small thieves” in the civil service while the gatekeepers negotiate their exit through cabalist legislation.

    2. The Incompetence Shield

    A High Court judge can be removed for incompetence.

    But for magistrates, the men and women deciding the everyday fate of boda riders, widows, and shopkeepers, incompetence does not lead to automatic removal. Parliament has allowed a regime where the “big fish” are fired for failing, but the “small sharks” are legally protected and recycled.

    Why are judicial officers more “special” than nurses, teachers, engineers or lawyers in the civil service or private sector who are fired the moment they prove incompetent?

    Because Parliament never built the walls.

    3. The “Two-Man” Recruitment Cartel

    Parliament’s silence allowed the Judicial Service Commission to create committees where the quorum is a mere two people, less than 50% of the committee.

    The entire future of Uganda’s Bench can now be decided by two individuals in a private room, bypassing the multi-stakeholder wisdom the Constitution mandates.

    Two people.

    Deciding who judges you.

    And Parliament watches.

    4. The Executive “Pocket Veto”

    Under Section 13(6) of the Act, no judge can be disciplined unless the Attorney General, the government’s own lawyer, is physically present.

    By simply not showing up, the Executive holds a de facto veto over judicial accountability.

    The government’s defender decides whether the judges who rule against the government face discipline.

    You do not need a law degree to smell this rot.

    5. Criminalizing Transparency

    Instead of “open justice,” Parliament enacted Sections 17 and 23, making it a criminal offense to disclose Judicial Service Commission records without permission.

    They didn’t just fail to build the granary.

    They made it a crime to look inside and see what is being stolen.

    6. The “Non-Accountable” Ghost Tier

    By failing to define “Judicial Officer” properly, the law creates a phantom tier of Registrars, Deputy Registrars, Assistant Registrars, Chief Magistrates and Tribunal actors who exercise power over citizens but are legally insulated from oversight.

    They have the power of a judge.

    They have the accountability of a ghost.

    7. The Commission That Judges Itself

    The Judicial Service Commission receives complaints. Investigates them. Prosecutes them. Hears them. Decides them.

    Investigator. Prosecutor. Judge. Jury.

    All in one hut.

    We are warned about such concentration of power. But warnings without legislative correction are like a quarrel of drunkards at the village square.

    Parliament heard the warning.

    Parliament did nothing.

    AND WHEN THE VILLAGERS COMPLAINED…

    When the Uganda Law Society, noisy, stubborn, unapologetic  and unyielding, attempted to intervene?

    Injunctions.
    Uncause-listed petitions.
    Elections stalled.
    Appointments to the Judiciary proceeded like wedding ceremonies that will not wait for objections.

    The granary was gutted politely.

    “SHUT UP! YOU ARE GIVING US TRAUMA”

    At the 2026 New Law Year, Chief Justice Flavian Zeija warned that social media attacks on judges would not be tolerated. Online criticism, he said, causes trauma and will be crushed.

    Trauma from tweets?

    Try the trauma of five years on remand while your case gathers dust.
    Try the trauma of losing ancestral land because you cannot afford a surveyor.
    Try the trauma of watching a bribe walk free while your child rots in detention.

    The Uganda Law Society replied, correctly, that scrutiny is constitutional oxygen.

    But the Chief Justice’s instinct was not an accident.

    It was Okello Anyapo protesting demands for answers when Uncle Apur required answers for the granary that was depleted because he gave access without regulation. He permitted Anyapo to eat without brakes.

    Because the elders of Abongodero reminded Apur that the roots of accountability are bitter but the fruits are sweet!.

    [End of Episode 2]