I. Gethsemane, 33 AD
There is a moment in the Gospel of Mark that haunts every leader, every judge, every system builder.
Jesus goes to the Garden of Gethsemane to pray. He takes Peter, James, and John. He is sorrowful, troubled, facing the cross. He asks them to stay awake, to watch with him.
Then he walks away, prays, returns – and finds them sleeping.
“Simon, are you asleep? Could you not keep watch for one hour?” (Mark 14:37)
He warns them: “Watch and pray, so that you will not fall into temptation. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.” (Matthew 26:41)
They sleep again. Then the mob arrives. Jesus is arrested. And the disciples flee. Peter denies him three times out of fear.
The consequence of sleeping? Failure at the moment of testing.
II. Gethsemane, Buganda Road Court, 2026
On 21 May 2026, an advocate appeared before a Magistrate at Buganda Road Chief Magistrate’s Court. His client had been charged with obtaining 600 million shillings by false pretence. The Advocate had uploaded bail application documents onto ECCMIS – the Judiciary’s flagship electronic case management system.
The Advocate asked to be heard on bail.
The Magistrate tried to access the uploaded documents.
The network failed.
ECCMIS would not display the files. The magistrate could not see the bail application. And instead of invoking the fallback provisions of the law – instead of assisting the advocate under Rule 9(4) and Rule 24(5) of the Judicature (Electronic Filing) Rules, 2025 – the Magistrate declined to hear the application.
The Advocate was remanded to Luzira Prison until 4 June 2026.
The system slept. And justice went to Luzira.
III. The Spirit Is Willing – But the Flesh Is Weak
The Judicature (Electronic Filing, Service and Virtual Proceedings) Rules, 2025 (S.I. No. 21 of 2025) are, on paper, remarkably progressive.
Rule 24(5) of the Rules provide thus:
The court may, in its discretion, adjust the schedule for responding to any affected filings, postpone the next court event, or provide other relief. It is my view that “others relief” includes a fall back position to actually hear the bail application manually, the network failure notwithstanding.
The spirit of these Rules is willing. No judiciary transitions from paper to digital systems without friction, uncertainty, or implementation failures – and Uganda is no exception.
But the flesh – the actual ECCMIS software and the training (or lack thereof) of judicial officers – is weak.
The magistrate did not invoke Rule 24(5) Did not provide other relief i.e. a fall back position to actually hear the bail application, Why?
Two possibilities – and both point away from individual malice and toward systemic failure.
IV. Why Did the Court Sleep? Two Systemic Failures
First: No offline caching in ECCMIS.
If ECCMIS had an automatic local cache, the Magistrate’s computer would have downloaded all documents for that day’s matters the night before – or upon morning boot, or periodically. Even if the live network failed, the cached documents would remain accessible. The bail application would have been visible. The hearing could have proceeded.
But ECCMIS, as currently deployed, appears to depend heavily on live connectivity. When the network fails, the court becomes blind. That is not a user error. That is an architecture flaw – though I write as an external observer, not as someone with access to internal design documents.
What is needed: A software update that configures ECCMIS to:
· Pre‑cache all case files for matters listed on a given day.
· Update the cache every morning or whenever internet is available.
· Allow offline access with a clear timestamp (“cached as of [time]”).
· Sync back to the central system once connectivity is restored.
This is not rocket science. Email clients do it. Mobile banking apps do it. Google Drive, One Drive and other online file back-up systems do it. Even WhatsApp caches messages offline. The Judiciary’s ECCMIS can do it – if the builders prioritise resilience over assumption of constant connectivity.
Second: Inadequate training of judicial officers.
Rule 60 of the 2025 Rules commands:
The court shall, in collaboration with stakeholders, periodically undertake training for court users, judicial officers, unrepresented litigants and the public on use of ECCMIS.
Where is that training? If Magistrates do not know they can assist under Rule 9(4), if they do not know they can order a paper fallback – then the Rules are dead letters. The fault is not primarily the Magistrate’s. The fault is the system that failed to prepare her.
The Magistrate in Buganda Road was not malicious. She was unprepared. She was left alone with a broken network and no institutional backup. And like Peter in Gethsemane, she found herself in a situation where the institution had not equipped her to watch – the failure was systemic, not merely personal.
V. The Blame Must Shift
Public anger after the Buganda Road incident has, predictably, focused on the Magistrate. Some have called her incompetent. Others have suggested bias.
I disagree.
The Magistrate is the front‑line foot soldier of a digital transformation that was rolled out without full readiness. She was given a system that struggles offline, and no training on what to do when it fails. She was handed a beautiful set of Rules (S.I. 2025 No. 21) but not the practical tools to implement them.
The real responsibility lies with:
· The architects of ECCMIS – who designed a system that assumes perpetual internet connectivity in a country where power and data are unreliable.
· The Judiciary’s leadership – who rolled out the paperless mandate without ensuring that every Magistrate understands Rules 9 and 24, and without installing basic offline caching.
· The training units – who have not conducted the mandatory training required by Rule 60.
Yes, the Magistrate could have done more. She could have read the Rules. She could have asked for an adjournment. She could have called the registry. But when a system fails, we do not blame the soldier alone. We also examine the armour and the General who deployed him and gave the orders.
VI. A Concrete Way Forward
The solution is not to abandon ECCMIS. It is to fix it.
1. Technical fix: offline caching.
The Judiciary’s ICT team must implement automatic local caching on all court computers. This is a one‑time software upgrade that pays for itself within weeks by eliminating network‑related adjournments.
2. Training fix: mandatory, periodic, verifiable.
Every judicial officer and court clerk must undergo hands‑on training on:
· How to use offline mode.
· How to invoke Rule 9(4) to assist litigants.
· How to grant relief under Rule 24(5).
· How to handle network failures without remanding people, especially when the question of Bail, which touches on the liberty and presumption of innocence of an accused person comes up for consideration.
3. Accountability fix: a practice direction.
The Chief Justice should issue a practice direction reminding all courts of their obligations under Rules 9 and 24, and requiring that any refusal to hear a matter due to ECCMIS failure be accompanied by a written explanation of why Rules 9(4) and 24(5) for fall back positions could not be followed.
VII. Gethsemane, 2026 and Beyond
Jesus did not condemn the disciples for sleeping. He warned them. He told them to watch and pray – because the flesh is weak.
The flesh of ECCMIS is weak. The network fails. The cache is absent. The training is insufficient. But the spirit of the Rules is willing.
The question is whether the Judiciary will watch – or continue to sleep.
Because every time a Magistrate refuses to assist a litigant when ECCMIS fails, every time an Advocate or his client is remanded because the network is down, every time justice is delayed or denied not by malice but by unpreparedness – that is not a technical glitch.
That is the agony of an unprepared court.
And the consequence is always the same: those who came seeking justice flee. Their rights are denied. Their liberty is lost. And the system that was meant to protect them becomes the very instrument of their suffering.
“Could you not keep watch for one hour?”
The hour is now. The network will fail again. The question is not if – but when, and how the court responds.
Will we equip our Magistrates (and in fact all judicial officers) to stay awake? Or will we keep sending accused persons to Luzira because the cache was empty and the training never came?
The spirit is willing. Let us finally strengthen the flesh.
DISCLAIMERS:
This blog is not an attack on the Magistrate who handled the Buganda Road matter. Magistrates work under enormous pressure with limited resources. The critique here is directed at systemic failures: the architecture of ECCMIS, the inadequacy of training, and the absence of offline preparedness. Fair commentary is not personal attack.
This blog is not legal advice. Readers should consult qualified attorneys for case‑specific guidance.
Enen Ambrose
Member, Judiciary Affairs Committee, Uganda Law Society
For comments or feedback: enen@enenlegalworld.com
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